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This paper investigates the instantaneous and dynamic
eﬀects of ECB forward guidance announcements on the term
structure of interest rates. We estimate the static and dynamic
impacts of forward guidance on overnight indexed swaps (OIS)
rates using a high-frequency methodology and an ARCH
model, complemented with local projections. We ﬁnd that
ECB forward guidance announcements have lowered the term
structure of private short-term interest rates at most matu-
rities, even after controlling for the macroeconomic informa-
tion published by the ECB. The eﬀect is stronger on longer
maturities and persistent.
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1. Introduction
After the European Central Bank (ECB) cut the main reﬁnancing
operations (MRO) rate towards its eﬀective lower bound in 2010,
forward guidance became one of the only tools available to provide
monetary accommodation (Eggertson and Woodford 2003), together
with liquidity provisions and asset purchases. “The Governing Coun-
cil expects the key interest rates to remain at present or lower levels
for an extended period of time.” With this statement pronounced
on July 4, 2013 after the meeting of the ECB Board of Governors,
Mario Draghi adopted a new communication strategy. On January
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9, 2014, Mario Draghi reinforced the use of this communication pol-
icy: “We ﬁrmly reiterate our forward guidance that we continue to
expect the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels
for an extended period of time.” This paper aims to investigate the
impact of these forward guidance announcements on the yield curve.
Because long-term interest rates—a key determinant of investment
and consumption decisions—depend on expected short-term interest
rates plus a term premium, overnight indexed swaps (OIS) are a nat-
ural candidate for measuring the eﬀect of forward guidance. Indeed,
the OIS curve represents a combination of short-term interest rate
expectations and term premiums. We therefore estimate the eﬀect
of ECB forward guidance on daily changes in OIS rates at maturi-
ties from one month to ten years ahead. We use a high-frequency
identiﬁcation and an autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
(ARCH) model, estimated both in a static fashion and with local
projections a` la Jorda` (2005) for measuring dynamic eﬀects.
Central banks have enhanced transparency of their actions and
communication to the public over the last decades in order to better
signal future policy decisions, shape private expectations, and opti-
mize their policy outcomes (see, e.g., Geraats 2002; Woodford 2005;
King, Lu, and Pasten 2008; and Reis 2013). The question of whether
central bank communication has had a positive impact on ﬁnan-
cial markets or helped predict policy decisions has given rise to an
abundant literature surveyed by Blinder et al. (2008). However, the
question of its transmission mechanism and why central bank com-
munication aﬀects private beliefs remains a much more open ques-
tion. Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005a) showed the importance
of information about the future policy path embedded in Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) statements that aﬀect ﬁnancial
markets. One possibility is that central bank communications reveal
signals to private agents about policymakers’ views about the cur-
rent and future state of the economy. This paper explores the other
possibility that such communications reveal policymakers’ reaction
functions (their objectives and planned responses to diﬀerent states
of the world) and include forward guidance and the commitment to
deviate from a given rule.
Two types of forward guidance policy have been used by cen-
tral banks so far. The FOMC adopted time-contingent commitment
from December 2008 to December 2012. After that it was replaced by
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a state-contingent commitment conditional on the evolution of the
labor market. The Bank of England also introduced state-contingent
forward guidance conditional on unemployment in August 2013.
Similarly, the Bank of Japan used state-contingent forward guid-
ance conditional on inﬂation between October 2010 and March 2013.
The Bank of Canada implemented time-contingent forward guidance
between April 2009 and April 2010, while the Swedish Riksbank did
so during two periods between April 2009 and July 2010 and between
February 2013 and December 2014. Finally, the ECB implemented
time-contingent forward guidance without referring to an end date
or a precise period of time.
But an announcement that interest rates will remain low is
ambiguous: it may reﬂect an anticipation of bad economic fundamen-
tals or an anticipation of a more accommodative monetary policy.1
Campbell et al. (2012) introduced the distinction between Delphic
and Odyssean forward guidance, where the former describes commu-
nication about future macroeconomic fundamentals and the latter
consists of statements that bind policymakers to future courses of
action. They suggest for the United States that the market par-
ticipants’ interpretation of the FOMC’s announcements is Delphic.
Campbell et al. (2017) show that responses of private expectations to
movements in policy rates on FOMC announcement days can also
be attributed in part to Delphic forward guidance. But Odyssean
forward guidance remains a possibility, as a large fraction of the
variability of futures rates on announcement days remains unex-
plained. For the euro-area case, Andrade and Ferroni (2016) ﬁnd
that the ECB communication was Delphic since 2002 but has been
interpreted as a signal about future monetary policy (the Odyssean
type) over the most recent period. Bletzinger and Wieland (2016)
analyze whether the ECB forward guidance follows the outcome of
a policy rule and therefore is about transparency, or deviates from
1This is possible only in a framework where private agents and the central
bank have diﬀerent information sets, so the central bank has some private infor-
mation to reveal to the public (see, e.g., Baeriswyl and Cornand 2010, Hubert
and Maule 2016, and Melosi 2017 for analysis of situations where monetary pol-
icy decisions signal central banks’ information to the private sector). If private
agents and the central bank have a similar information set, forward guidance can
only be a pure commitment mechanism: a promise by the central bank to keep
future policy rates lower than its policy rule suggests.
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it, therefore signaling an accommodative policy stance. In addition,
Andrade et al. (2015) ﬁnd that forward guidance reduces the dis-
persion of professional forecasts for interest rates but has no eﬀect
on their dispersion for output or inﬂation. In contrast, our paper
focuses on the eﬀect of forward guidance on the level of the yield
curve.
The empirical evidence about how forward guidance policies
aﬀect the macroeconomy is rather homogenous.2 Ben Zeev, Gunn,
and Khan (2015), Gertler and Karadi (2015), Bundick and Smith
(2016), and D’Amico and King (2016) ﬁnd that real activity and
prices decline after a positive forward guidance shock. Gertler and
Karadi (2015) ﬁnd that the response of long-term interest rates can-
not be explained by the expected path of short rates, which should
be the main channel through which forward guidance operates. The
transmission channels of forward guidance and, in particular, the
horizons at which it would lower the yield curve are much less docu-
mented. The objective of this paper is then to quantify the eﬀect of
forward guidance at various maturities of the term structure of OIS
rates.3
Because private-sector decisions depend on the entire path of
expected future short-term interest rates and term premiums, this
2These communication policies have also given rise to an abundant theoretical
literature. Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2012), Del Negro, Giannoni, and Pat-
terson (2015), Kiley (2016), and McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2016) focus on
optimal monetary policy under Odyssean guidance and its macroeconomic eﬀects.
Bassetto (2015) studies the cheap talk problems resulting from forward guidance
policies. Gavin et al. (2014) show that the accommodative eﬀect of forward guid-
ance is oﬀset by the underlying central bank predictions of near-term economic
growth, while Gaballo (2016) documents that imperfect information reduces the
eﬃciency of forward guidance. Boneva, Harrison, and Waldron (2015) analyze
the beneﬁts of threshold-based forward guidance to stimulate the economy, as an
insurance against the asymmetric eﬀects of shocks and a credible announcement.
3This paper is related to the literature on the value of publishing interest rate
projections, a form of forward guidance, and on the predictability of future policy
decisions. Moessner and Nelson (2008), Rudebush and Williams (2008), Anders-
son and Hofmann (2009), Svensson (2015), and Mirkov and Natvik (2016) have
assessed the eﬀects of the publication of central bank interest rate projections.
Kool and Thornton (2012), Raskin (2013), Filardo and Hofmann (2014), and
Moessner (2015) have assessed the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of guidance about the
future policy path. Jansen and De Haan (2009), Hayo and Neuenkirch (2010),
Middeldorp (2011), and Sturm and De Haan (2011) have analyzed how other
forms of central bank communication may help predict future policy decisions.
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paper investigates the eﬀect of ECB forward guidance announce-
ments on the term structure of OIS rates at maturities from one
month to ten years ahead. We use the same high-frequency event-
study methodology as the literature on the impact of macroeconomic
news and policy announcements on ﬁnancial market variables (see,
e.g., Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Swanson 2005b or Swanson and Williams
2014). We control for the eﬀect of monetary decisions taken the same
day as forward guidance announcements, especially communication
policies about the future policy path. To do so, we use two meas-
ures of monetary shocks. The ﬁrst one is based on Kuttner (2001)
high-frequency methodology and the second is computed from the
Krippner (2013, 2014) shadow rate that encompasses various mone-
tary dimensions (conventional and unconventional instruments and
communication) in interest rate space. As is common with ﬁnancial
variables and because of evidence of “volatility clustering,” we use
an ARCH model developed by Engle (1982) to properly account for
the presence of heteroskedasticity. Finally, we estimate the dynamic
eﬀects using the local projections method of Jorda` (2005).
We ﬁnd that ECB forward guidance announcements have low-
ered the full term structure of private short-term interest rates. The
result is stronger on longer maturities and is persistent. The result is
robust to diﬀerent estimation models (GARCH, TARCH, and OLS),
to diﬀerent estimation windows, and to controlling for the inclusion
of ECB and private macroeconomic forecasts in the empirical spec-
iﬁcation. The latter test suggests that the eﬀect of these announce-
ments is more about the stance of future policy than about revealing
macroeconomic information. This is consistent with the sign of the
eﬀect of a forward guidance announcement: while the statement is
about keeping interest rates at “present or lower levels,” the eﬀect
on OIS rates is strongly negative.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the data, section 3 the empirical strategy, and section 4 the esti-
mates. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data
Our dependent variables are the diﬀerent maturities of the OIS rate,
from one month to ten years forward. The OIS rate being the average
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EONIA (euro overnight index average) expected at a given matu-
rity, these instruments are a combination of expectations of future
short-term interest rates plus a term premium. OIS allow ﬁnancial
institutions to swap the interest rates they are paying without hav-
ing to reﬁnance or change the terms of loans they have taken from
other ﬁnancial institutions. Typically, when two ﬁnancial institu-
tions create an OIS, one of the institutions is swapping a ﬂoating
interest rate and the other institution is swapping a ﬁxed short-term
interest rate at a given maturity. The transaction involves only mar-
ginal counterparty risk since the principal amount is not exchanged
between the parties.4 Under absence of arbitrage, OIS rates would
reﬂect risk-adjusted ﬁnancial market participants’ expectations of
the average policy rate over the horizon corresponding to the matu-
rity of the swap (see Christensen and Rudebusch 2012 or Bauer and
Rudebusch 2014). Our data set, collected from Datastream, has a
daily frequency across the term structure and spans from August
2005 to June 2015.
Following the literature on the impact of macroeconomic news
and policy announcements on ﬁnancial market variables, we use a
dummy variable, labeled FGt, taking the value of one on July 4,
2013 and January 9, 2014 to single out dates of ECB forward guid-
ance announcements. In July 2013, the MRO rate was at 0.50 per-
cent. The euro zone was facing downward price pressures and the
forward guidance policy was implemented as a means to send an
additional accommodative signal without bringing the policy rate
closer to the zero lower bound. Although the MRO rate was even-
tually cut to 0.25 percent in November 2013, depressed underlying
price pressures along with tightened money market conditions led
the ECB to “ﬁrmly reiterate” its forward guidance in January 2014.
During these two meetings, the Governing Council kept all ECB
interest rates unchanged and no other non-standard policy meas-
ures were announced, so the dummy variable of these two events
only captures the forward guidance announcements.5 The variable
4OIS rates are then free of default or liquidity risks, but they may still incor-
porate a so-called term premium (see Piazzesi and Swanson 2008).
5The statement of July 4, 2013 is available at www.ecb.europa.eu/press/
pressconf/2013/html/is130704.en.html and the statement of January 9, 2014 at
www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is140109.en.html.
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FGt captures two heterogeneous events with potentially diﬀerent
information contents. In a second step, we decompose the forward
guidance announcements into two dummy variables to disentangle
the eﬀect of each event. In addition, one may consider that the
announcement of the ECB quantitative easing (QE) program, known
as the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), on January 22,
2015 constitutes a sort of forward guidance, since the policy rate is
assumed to remain low during the period of asset purchases. The
announcement of this program works as time-contingent forward
guidance and may also be taken into consideration.6 In a third step,
we consider an FG QE t variable that includes the QE announcement
as an additional forward guidance event.
The fact that there was no policy rate change and no unconven-
tional policy announcements on the days of the forward guidance
announcements does not mean that there was no policy innovation
or no policy surprise on these days.7 Therefore, our analysis requires
controlling for monetary shocks in our empirical model. We use two
complementary measures of such shocks. Kuttner (2001) proposes
a high-frequency methodology. For a monetary policy event on day
d of the month m, the monetary shock can be derived from the
variation in the rate implied by current-month federal funds futures
contracts on that day. The price of the future being computed as
the average monthly rate, the change in the futures rate must be
augmented by a factor related to the number of days in the month
aﬀected by the change:
MPkutt,t =
D
D − d(f
0
m,d − f0m,d−1). (1)
MPkutt,t is the unexpected policy decision constituting the mone-
tary shock, f0m,d is the current-month futures rate, D is the number
of days in the month, and d is the day of the decision.
One issue with the Kuttner measure is that it focuses on futures
contracts relating to the interest rate only. Monetary policy, how-
ever, has taken many diﬀerent dimensions over the last years, and we
6Altavilla, Carboni, and Motto (2015) evaluate the eﬀect of the ECB asset
purchase program announcement on asset prices.
7Keeping the policy rate constant when the state of the economy evolves is
a policy innovation, while keeping the policy rate constant when private agents
expect a change is a policy surprise.
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ought to consider shocks to unconventional instruments and commu-
nication policies (about the future policy path, for instance) in addi-
tion to shocks to the conventional instrument. One way to measure
these diﬀerent dimensions of monetary policy is to use shadow rates
as proposed by Krippner (2013, 2014) and Wu and Xia (2016) that
translate these various dimensions into a single variable expressed in
interest rate space.8 The Krippner shadow short rate (SSR) series is
estimated at the daily frequency, so the concept of Kuttner’s high-
frequency event-study identiﬁcation of monetary surprises can be
applied to the daily variation in SSRt on the policy announcement
day:
MPkripp,t = SSRt − SSRt−1. (2)
Because shadow rate measures are not calendar-based instruments
like federal funds futures, there is no need for an adjustment for the
remaining number of days. These Krippner shocks rely on the ﬁnan-
cial market participants’ interpretation of the overall monetary news
disclosed that day. This includes private reactions to central bank
conventional or unconventional decisions, and central bank commu-
nication (about the state of the economy or the likely future policy
path) released at the same time. Because these Krippner shocks
encompass most of the dimensions of monetary policy, they may also
capture some of the private reaction to forward guidance conveyed
the same day.9
In addition, we use diﬀerent macroeconomic and ﬁnancial vari-
ables as control variables. Our data set includes daily returns of the
Eurostoxx50, which could potentially correlate with changes in OIS
rates. In the same vein, commodity prices, ﬁnancial stress, or private
sentiment might also explain changes in our dependent variables.10
8Wu and Xia’s series is available at the monthly frequency only. Both shadow
rates have a correlation of 0.91.
9Another way to measure monetary shocks has been proposed by Gu¨rkaynak,
Sack, and Swanson (2005a) and their distinction between a “target factor” and
a “path factor.” Such measures are also provided by Nakamura and Steinsson
(2018). They measure, for the United States, shocks to the monetary policy news
contained in FOMC announcements and therefore capture policy communication
in general and “forward guidance” more speciﬁcally.
10Because these variables may also react to forward guidance, they could lead
us to underestimate the eﬀect of forward guidance announcements. However,
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We thus include in our speciﬁcation changes in WTI oil prices; a
variable capturing ﬁnancial stress in the euro area, the level of the
Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) interpolated from
weekly to daily frequency; and changes in private sentiment meas-
ured by the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) of the European
Commission.11
3. Empirical Methodology
We use a high-frequency methodology to estimate the eﬀects of for-
ward guidance, which focuses on movements in OIS rates in a nar-
row window around ECB meetings. This approach was initiated by
Cook and Hahn (1989), Kuttner (2001), and Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2002). The key assumption is that the reaction of OIS rates that are
continually aﬀected by various factors can be speciﬁcally attributed
to monetary policy news on the day of the policy announcement.
Said diﬀerently, there is no other macroeconomic news during that
window. Since the yield curve adjusts in real time to macro news,
movements in OIS rates during the window of a policy announce-
ment only reﬂect the eﬀect of news about monetary policy. This is
crucial for identiﬁcation since it strips out the endogenous variation
in OIS rates associated with other shocks than monetary news.
We focus our empirical analysis on a narrow window (from the
close of business the day before to close of business the day of
the announcement) around ECB policy announcements. We con-
trol for the policy decision implemented the same day using Kuttner
shocks.12 However, the Kuttner shocks capture only the interest rate
this bias goes against the hypothesis that FGt does aﬀect OIS rates. More-
over, as a robustness test, we allow the coeﬃcients of these controls to vary
on announcement days.
11 Weekly and monthly data are constant-interpolated to daily frequency to
respect the information structure. The assumption is that the information set
at date t includes the last data ﬁgure published, whereas a linear interpolation
would assume that agents already know the next data ﬁgure to be published. This
interpolation does not provide an original data point at the day of the forward
guidance announcement. However, these controls may explain OIS rates over the
sample, so their omission may bias the measure of the eﬀect of forward guidance
announcements.
12Because the policy decision and the forward guidance announcement are
announced in the same paragraph of the ECB Introductory Statement—one only
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dimension of monetary policy. On these days, policymakers not only
provide the decision about the interest rate but also provide deci-
sions about unconventional policies, publish statements about the
rationale for their decisions, and disclose their view about the cur-
rent and future state of the economy, which would be informative
of the future likely policy path. Our analysis therefore requires con-
trolling for all announcements other than those related to forward
guidance. Using a series of monetary shocks identiﬁed from a shadow
rate that captures all dimensions of monetary policy enables us to
capture the eﬀects of unconventional policies and of other communi-
cations on the term structure of interest rates, and so to single out
the eﬀect speciﬁc to pure forward guidance announcements. Esti-
mating the eﬀect of forward guidance when controlling for Krippner
shocks (that react to forward guidance announcements and could
potentially capture part of the eﬀect of forward guidance) should
provide more conservative estimates than the speciﬁcation estimated
with Kuttner shocks. Nevertheless, the speciﬁcation estimated with
Kuttner shocks would provide a more precise estimate of the eﬀect
of forward guidance than the one with Krippner shocks but might
suﬀer from an omitted-variable bias (i.e., unconventional policies,
for instance).
There are two other issues that we need to overcome. First,
as is common with ﬁnancial variables, the variance of our depen-
dent variables changes over time. We therefore use an ARCH model
to address this “volatility clustering.” Second, because of potential
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the residuals, we compute
robust standard errors using the Huber-White-sandwich (HAC) esti-
mator. The ARCH model is estimated with maximum likelihood at
the daily frequency (so on 2,575 observations) and the estimated
equations are the following:
ΔrEt,m = β0 + β1FGt + β2MP j,t + β3Ct + εt, εt ∼ (0, σ2t ) (3)
σ2t = γ0 +
p∑
i=1
γiε
2
t−i, (4)
a few seconds after the other—we would need extremely high-frequency data to
single out the market reaction to the forward guidance announcement speciﬁcally.
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where ΔrEt,m is the change between t and t − 1 in euro-area OIS
rates for a given maturity m, FGt is the ECB forward guidance
dummy, and MP j,t is the monetary shock (j being either Kuttner
or Krippner shocks). Ct is a vector of controls including the CISS,
Eurostoxx50 daily returns, oil price daily variations, and the ESI
index. The number of lags p in the variance equation is determined
by their signiﬁcance and set to one.13 We are particularly inter-
ested in the β1 coeﬃcient. This should be interpreted as the eﬀect of
ECB forward guidance on OIS rates controlling for other monetary
announcements, as well as other ﬁnancial developments captured by
the Ct vector that might have potentially occurred on the same days.
4. The Eﬀects of Forward Guidance
4.1 Baseline Estimates
We assess the impact of ECB forward guidance on OIS rates at the
horizons of one, three, six, and nine months, and one, two, three,
ﬁve, and ten years. Our estimation sample starts in August 2005,
so we have 2,575 observations for each maturity. Table 1 shows the
baseline estimates using, alternatively, Kuttner and Krippner shocks
as measures for monetary shocks.14
In panel A of table 1, we control for Kuttner monetary shocks.
The β1 coeﬃcient associated with forward guidance announcements
is negative and signiﬁcant for the nine-month and one-, two-, and
three-year maturities. When controlling for Krippner shocks (panel
B of table 1), the β1 coeﬃcient associated with forward guidance
announcements remains negative and signiﬁcant at the one-, six-,
and nine-month and one-, two-, three-, and ﬁve-year horizons. Both
estimated parameters have the same magnitude. We note that the
eﬀect of the FGt dummy is slightly stronger when controlling for
Kuttner shocks, as expected. The peak eﬀect is on the longest
maturities, forward guidance announcements decreasing OIS rates
by around 4 and 5 basis points at the three- and ﬁve-year hori-
zons. Andrade and Ferroni (2016) ﬁnd that, in the case of the ECB,
13We assess the sensitivity of the results to this choice in the robustness section.
14For sake of clarity, parameters of the control variables are not shown in table 1
but are shown in table 2 in the appendix.
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Delphic forward guidance is at work at short horizons, whereas
Odyssean forward guidance gets more important at the medium
term. This suggests that the eﬀect evidenced here on medium-run
horizons may be interpreted as a signal about the future policy
stance, i.e., the Odyssean forward guidance.15
The β2 coeﬃcient associated with Kuttner and Krippner shocks
is positive and signiﬁcant for all maturities, indicating that a restric-
tive monetary shock increases OIS rates. The β2 coeﬃcient asso-
ciated with Kuttner shocks (panel A) is positive and signiﬁcant,
but smaller and less signiﬁcant than for Krippner shocks (panel B).
These results are consistent with the fact that interest rate vari-
ations are not the unique instrument used by the ECB over the
sample period. In that respect, Krippner shocks provide a more
relevant measure of the ECB monetary stance because they encom-
pass unconventional policies and communication, including the likely
future policy path. It suggests that forward guidance announcements
have had a negative eﬀect beyond the usual communication about
potential future intentions.16
For each of the two panels of table 1 (using Kuttner or Krippner
shocks), we show estimates of alternative speciﬁcations when diﬀer-
entiating the eﬀects of the two announcements of forward guidance.
Figure 1 plots these estimated parameters for each announcement.
The results suggest that the ﬁrst announcement has driven most
of the eﬀects induced by forward guidance on the OIS rates. The
eﬀect of the second forward guidance announcement is also negative
and signiﬁcant but sizably smaller, especially at the longer horizons.
Because the announcement of the QE program on January 22, 2015
may be interpreted as a signal that policy rates would remain low
until its end, it may be considered as another way for the ECB to
reiterate and extend the forward guidance policy. For each of the two
panels of table 1, we provide estimates for a speciﬁcation that uses
the FG QE dummy in equation (3). The negative and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on OIS rates is conﬁrmed.
15A complementary possibility for explaining the eﬀect of forward guidance
announcements is that it may transmit to private agents through another chan-
nel of monetary policy—the risk-taking channel—and may aﬀect the risk aversion
of market participants and therefore the term premium embedded in OIS rates.
16Table 2 in the appendix shows the estimated parameters of the control vari-
ables and of the variance equation.
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Figure 1. Estimates of Forward Guidance Announcements
Notes: Panel A shows the response of the term structure of interest rates at
diﬀerent maturities following the July 2013 forward guidance announcement (left
bar for each maturity) and the January 2014 forward guidance announcement
(right bar for each maturity), with a 99 percent conﬁdence interval, when con-
trolling for Kuttner shocks in equation (3). Panel B shows similar information
when controlling for Krippner shocks.
4.2 Alternative Estimates
In this subsection, we estimate alternative speciﬁcations to assess the
robustness of the baseline estimates. These speciﬁcations consider
Krippner shocks as monetary shocks in order to provide conserva-
tive estimates of the eﬀects of forward guidance. Because forward
guidance announcements may be interpreted as a signal about the
economic outlook (Delphic forward guidance), we assess whether
controlling for the central bank macroeconomic information set
208 International Journal of Central Banking December 2018
modiﬁes the baseline results.17 We also control for the private agents’
macroeconomic information set.18 Since Krippner shocks are based
on ﬁnancial market participants’ reactions to policy announcements,
they may capture some of the reaction to forward guidance, so we
test the eﬀect of removing them. In addition, because the inclusion
of the Eurostoxx index as a control variable may bias the meas-
urement of the announcement eﬀect, we investigate the impact of
removing this control. We also estimate equation (3) when allow-
ing the coeﬃcients associated with the control variables in the daily
ARCH speciﬁcation to vary on statements days compared with non-
statement days. We go on to test whether including changes in the
monthly changes in the Wu and Xia (2016) shadow rate modiﬁes esti-
mates of the eﬀect of forward guidance announcements. This shadow
rate measure is only available at a monthly frequency, however, so
it cannot be used to estimate monetary shocks in a high-frequency
event-study fashion. Nevertheless, it might still contain some infor-
mation about the policy stance that would aﬀect the impact of for-
ward guidance. Finally, we examine whether including a measure
of FOMC monetary shocks, identiﬁed with Krippner’s shadow rate
for the United States, aﬀects our estimation. Estimates provided in
table 3 in the appendix conﬁrm in all cases that the eﬀect of forward
guidance announcements is negative and signiﬁcant. As expected,
the point estimate is stronger when not controlling for monetary
shocks. Interestingly, the eﬀect of forward guidance announcements
is unchanged when controlling for ECB projections and SPF fore-
casts, suggesting that the eﬀect at work may be mainly Odyssean.
We perform a second series of robustness tests related to the
econometric speciﬁcations tested. We test an alternative ARCH
speciﬁcation with two and four lags in the variance equation or
alternative estimation methods such as GARCH and TARCH mod-
els. GARCH models enable one to take into account the variance of
17The ECB/Eurosystem staﬀ macroeconomic projections for the euro area are
produced quarterly since June 2004. They are published in March, June, Septem-
ber, and December and are presented as ranges for annual percentage changes in
inﬂation and real GDP.
18The ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) is a quarterly survey of
expectations of inﬂation, real GDP growth, and unemployment in the euro area.
Participants are experts aﬃliated with ﬁnancial or non-ﬁnancial institutions. SPF
inﬂation forecasts are produced in February, May, August, and November.
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lagged residuals in the variance equation. Threshold ARCH enables
one to take into account the asymmetric nature of positive and
negative innovations: positive and negative shocks have a diﬀer-
ent eﬀect on volatility. On ﬁnancial markets, downward movements
(“bad news”) are followed by higher market volatility than upward
movements (“good news”). We also estimate equation (3) with ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) and HAC-corrected robust standard errors
both on all days and on statement days only (so on 115 observations).
Finally, we increase the window over which we assess the response
of changes in OIS rates (between t − 1 to t in the baseline case) to
t+1, t+2, and t+3.19 Table 4 in the appendix provides estimates of
the eﬀect of forward guidance for all these cases and conﬁrms that
the baseline results are robust and do not depend on the type of
estimation performed. Interestingly, estimations on wider windows
show that the negative eﬀect of forward guidance announcements
tends to reinforce and shift to longer maturities.
4.3 Dynamic Estimates
We also investigate how persistent is the contemporaneous eﬀect
of forward guidance announcements. More speciﬁcally, we test the
null hypothesis that the eﬀect of forward guidance is oﬀset during
the following days.20 We use the local projections method of Jorda`
(2005), which suggests estimating a set of h regressions represent-
ing the impulse response of the dependent variable at the horizon
h to a given variable at time t.21 We assess the dynamic eﬀects of
ECB forward guidance announcements on the following twenty-ﬁve
business days, so we estimate twenty-ﬁve diﬀerent regressions of the
ARCH model represented by equations (3) and (4), each of them
measuring the eﬀect of forward guidance announcements at date t
19This goes against the very objective of high-frequency studies isolating an
event from others and should reduce the precision of the estimation.
20Because signals can be noisy or costly to process or because of learning mech-
anisms, it might be that the initial reaction is diﬀerent from the true reaction
after some days.
21Impulse response functions obtained from VARs may be imposing excessive
restrictions on the endogenous dynamics, so estimates derived from more-ﬂexible
approaches might be preferable. Another advantage is the robustness of local pro-
jections to model misspeciﬁcation to estimate dynamic responses to exogenous
shocks.
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on daily changes in OIS rates h days later (h going from 1 to 25).
Equations (5) and (6) show how the initial ARCH model is speciﬁed
for a given horizon h:
ΔrEt+h,m = β0,h + β1,hFGt + β2,hMP j,t + β3,hCt
+ εt+h, εt+h ∼ (0, σ2t+h) (5)
σ2t+h = γ0,h +
p∑
i=1
γi,hε
2
t+h−i. (6)
Figure 2 is made up of six panels, for nine-month and one-, two-,
three-, ﬁve-, and ten-year OIS rates.22 Each of these panels plots the
responses of ΔrEt+h,m over the following twenty-ﬁve business days to
forward guidance announcements. Said diﬀerently, each panel plots
the β1,h coeﬃcient from the twenty-ﬁve regressions. Estimates show
that the eﬀect of forward guidance announcements on maturities
until one year is very small, but we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the eﬀect is oﬀset during the following days. For maturities
between two and ten years, the pattern is diﬀerent and suggests
that the eﬀect is persistent. We observe that the negative eﬀect
measured on the day of the announcement is not oﬀset during the
twenty-ﬁve following days. There is no signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on
the following days that would oﬀset the contemporaneous negative
eﬀect. The cumulated local projection eﬀect also suggests that the
impact of forward guidance is not oﬀset and even tends to increase
over time.23 This ﬁnding is consistent with the results of the robust-
ness tests using wider estimation windows presented in section 4.2
that show that the eﬀect of forward guidance announcements is neg-
ative and signiﬁcant even three days after the event date. In addition,
the eﬀect of forward guidance announcements appears to be stronger
for longer-term maturities, consistent with the outcome presented in
section 4.2.
22Results for other maturities are available from the authors upon request.
23The cumulated local projections are provided without conﬁdence bands since
they come from diﬀerent estimations and their standard errors come from diﬀer-
ent variance-covariance matrices, and are thus indicative only.
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Figure 2. Local Projection Estimates
Notes: Impulse responses to forward guidance announcements, over the following
twenty-ﬁve business days, estimated with equations (5) and (6) for each horizon
using local projections with 90 percent conﬁdence intervals and the cumulated
eﬀect of estimates. The cumulated local projections are provided without conﬁ-
dence bands since they come from diﬀerent estimations and their standard errors
from diﬀerent variance-covariance matrices. These cumulated local projections
are indicative only.
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5. Conclusion
This paper estimates the eﬀect of ECB forward guidance announce-
ments on the term structure of short-term interest rates using a
high-frequency event-study methodology and an ARCH model, com-
plemented with local projections. We ﬁnd that forward guidance
announcements reduce OIS rates at most maturities. This result is
stronger for longer maturities and persistent. Furthermore, control-
ling for ECB and private macroeconomic information sets in the
empirical speciﬁcation does not alter the negative eﬀect of ECB for-
ward guidance announcement on the term structure of interest rates.
This suggests that the eﬀect of these announcements is more about
the stance of future ECB monetary policy than about signaling the
ECB’s views about the macroeconomic outlook.
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